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Abstract
We develop a structural model of the leverage choices of risk-averse
managers who are compensated with cash and stock. We further char-
acterize credit spread dynamics over the life of the debt. Managers
optimally balance the tax bene¯ts of debt with the utility cost that re-
sults from their ex-post asset substitution choices. Our model predicts
the existence of a U-shaped relationship between the cash component
of pay and leverage levels: when cash compensation is low, safe debt
with a high face value is issued and when cash compensation is high,
risky debt with a high face value is issued. At moderate levels of the
cash-to-stock value ratio low leverage is chosen but credit spreads can
be signi¯cant and again relate to compensation terms. The model il-
lustrates the quantitative importance of including agency costs in the
tradeo® theory of capital structure.
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11 Introduction
Corporate ¯nance theory seeks to describe the behavior of decision mak-
ers within a ¯rm and this behavior often interacts directly with the design
of corporate securities and their valuation. Structural models incorporate
ideas from both the corporate ¯nance and asset pricing literatures to explic-
itly model these connections, thereby relating primitive assumptions that
describe managers and their operating context to security choice and asset
price dynamics. This structural approach has had a particularly long his-
tory in the analysis of capital structure and corporate debt pricing, dating
back to Black and Scholes (1973), Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), and Mer-
ton (1974).1 These models postulate that managers maximize shareholder
value, an assumption that has been recently questioned and is di±cult to
verify empirically (see, for example, the survey by Baker, Ruback and Wur-
gler (2005)). Characteristics of managerial compensation can be observed,
however, and may or may not induce shareholder value maximization (John
and John (1993)). Hence, a natural question to address is: How do com-
pensation terms interact with debt choices and their price dynamics? Our
paper addresses this issue and formalizes these relationships. In so doing, our
theoretical exercise provides empirical predictions that can be translated into
new tests of the theories of compensation, debt choice, and debt dynamics.
More speci¯cally, our paper extends structural models of capital struc-
ture and credit spreads by considering the additional agency problem that
is created when the ¯rm is run by self-interested risk averse managers with
realistic compensation contracts. In particular, we assume that managers,
rather than shareholders, operate the ¯rm's ¯nancial and real assets. We
also assume that the manager's compensation includes both cash and stock
components, consistent with the empirical ¯nding that company stock hold-
ings are a signi¯cant component of CEO pay (see, for example, Hall and
1More recent structural models include Fisher, Heinkel and Zechner (1989), Leland
(1994), Leland and Toft (1996), Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001), Collin-Dufresne and
Goldstein (2001) and Titman and Tsyplakov (2003). Managers in these models are as-
sumed to maximize value, either of the ¯rm or of the ¯rm's shareholders, and their decisions
are typically restricted to choosing the debt amount, when to re¯nance, and when to de-
fault. Notable exceptions are Mauer and Triantis (1994), Leland (1998), and Hennessy
and Whited (2005) who allow shareholder value maximizing managers to also make op-
erating decisions. Their models thus incorporate elements of both the tradeo® theory of
capital structure (Modigliani and Miller (1963)) and of the agency costs of debt (Jensen
and Meckling (1976)) in a dynamic setting.
1Liebman (1998)).2 As a consequence, when debt is present the manager's
pay is convex in ¯rm value and he has the incentive to increase ¯rm volatil-
ity by engaging in asset substitution. Debt in our setting also has a direct
impact on ¯rm value since we assume that it gives rise to tax bene¯ts and
default costs. Managers, therefore, face an interesting tradeo® when choosing
leverage. Their wealth increases when leverage increases, due to the e®ect
of tax shields on the value of his stock holdings, but ¯rm risk also increases
because of ex-post asset substitution. The optimal leverage choice balances
the wealth bene¯t against the utility cost associated with higher risk.
Importantly, we ¯nd a non-monotonic relationship relating initial leverage
to the relative size of the cash component of compensation. Leverage is
highest when the cash/stock value ratio is either very high or very low. Credit
spreads of newly issued debt are very di®erent at these extremes, however.
Safe debt is issued when the cash component is relatively low, but risky
debt is issued when the cash component is relatively high. We also show
that when the cash component is at moderate levels managers issue less debt
and leverage choice is less sensitive to the contract terms. Within this range,
leverage ratios are similar but credit spreads are increasing in the level of cash
compensation. Thus, our ¯ndings highlight the importance of controlling for
the structure of managerial pay when valuing new debt.
Our theory also suggests that compensation terms can provide an eco-
nomic mechanism through which the quantitative predictions of debt choice
and credit spreads from structural models can be enhanced. This ¯nding
addresses the empirical weaknesses of existing structural models. First, they
predict that ¯rms will choose higher leverage levels than are observed in
practice (see, for example, Graham (2000)). Second, calibrated versions of
these models predict counterfactually low yields given any measured level of
¯rm leverage, especially for debt that is relatively safe (see Eom, Helwege
and Huang (2003)). Our work shows that these empirical shortcomings can
be addressed in a structural framework by introducing an asset substitution
incentive. We are able to provide parameterizations of our model that gen-
erate both low initial leverage and high initial credit spreads by varying the
manager's compensation terms.
Our work is related to Leland (1998) who also considers the impact of as-
set substitution on leverage choice and credit spreads. The key di®erence be-
2For other evidence see Murphy (1999) who provides a recent survey of the compensa-
tion literature.
2tween our models derives from the assumed objectives of the decision makers.
The focus of his model is on the leverage e®ects of stockholder-bondholder
con°icts and he conciously chooses to ignore manager-stockholder con°icts
(see his footnote 4). His managers, therefore, maximize shareholder value.
We extend his work by structurally modeling the impact of our risk-averse
manager's compensation terms. In addition, unlike in his setting where man-
agers are restricted to choose among only two pre-speci¯ed levels of volatil-
ity, our framework allows for the consideration of general forms of volatility
choice. Di®erences between our models lead to di®erent conclusions regard-
ing the importance of agency costs since we ¯nd a large quantitative impact
on leverage and credit spreads.
There are several recent papers that model operating decisions made by
risk-averse managers. Our paper is complementary to the work on optimal
contracting by Cadenillas, Cvitanic and Zapatero (2004) in which a manager,
who is compensated only with stock of a levered ¯rm, makes a volatility
and e®ort choice. Shareholders in their model choose debt and stock grant
amounts so as to maximize ¯rm value net of the cost of retaining the manager
and their optimal contract balances the bene¯ts of reducing moral hazard
against the compensation cost. Di®erent economic forces give rise to optimal
leverage in our model, as previously described. Furthermore, our managers
are paid, in part, with cash. By including this component of pay we generate
dramatically di®erent predictions regarding credit spreads since, unlike in
our model, the debt issued in Cadenillas, Cvitanic and Zapatero (2004) is
always riskless.
Lewellen (2003) undertakes an empirical investigation the relationship
between managerial compensation and capital structure. Our formal model
builds on her insight that stock compensation gives managers a tendency
to avoid debt and our model's predictions are consistent with her ¯ndings
that managerial preferences help explain ¯rm debt-equity choices. Our study
could also explain the empirical ¯ndings of Ortiz-Molina (2005) in which low
pay-for-performance sensitivity is associated with high leverage. Morellec
(2003) models manager-shareholder con°icts in a context where managers
derive direct utility from investing in and retaining control of new projects.
His model is capable of explaining the low leverage ratios observed in the
data, but he does not explore the model's implications for credit spreads.
Ju, Parrino, Poteshman and Weisbach (2003) consider the leverage choice
of a risk-averse manager but where managers do not make ex-post operat-
ing decisions. They undertake a careful calibration exercise and show that
3the model generates low optimal leverage ratios. Parrino, Poteshman and
Weisbach (2005) take the leverage choice as given and examine the decision
of a manager to accept or reject a project that may increase ¯rm value and
alter the unlevered asset dynamics. They again calibrate the model and ¯nd
that investment distortions are sensitive to the proportion of the manager's
wealth in stock. Neither this paper nor the previous one analyzes credit
spread dynamics.3
Our paper is also related to Carpenter (2000) who examines the portfolio
choices made by fund managers with compensation contracts and objective
functions like those we model. Although we share the same basic modeling
framework, the focus of the two papers is quite di®erent. First, we consider
optimal leverage choice in the presence of taxes and bankruptcy costs. This
is outside the context of Carpenter (2000) because by choosing the initial
leverage level, our managers endogenously alter the terms of their contract.
Second, we analyze the relationships between asset substitution and bond
yields, thereby extending her insights to the literature on credit spread mod-
eling.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
the model. Section 3 develops closed-form expressions for the asset substitu-
tion behavior, credit spreads, and security values. Section 4 characterizes the
optimal leverage choice and links this choice to the manager's compensation
terms. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
This section describes our assumptions and formally speci¯es the manager's
optimization problems.
2.1 Market and Firm Value Dynamics
Our model is developed in a partial equilibrium, complete markets setting.
We specify a pricing kernel with dynamics
dMt
Mt
= ¡rdt ¡ ®dzt
3Several other papers examine the quantitative impact of agency costs resulting from
stockholder-bondholder con°icts, including Mello and Parsons (1992), Parrino and Weis-
bach (1999), Moyen (2000) and Hennessey (2003).
4where r > 0 is the instantaneous risk-free rate, ® > 0 is the market risk
premium, z is a standard Brownian motion and where M0 = 1.
We consider a ¯rm with a ¯nite life T that generates a liquidating cash-
°ow of VT at the terminal date.4 This cash payment will be shared among the
¯rm's equity- and debt-holders, and will also serve to pay taxes. A manager
has the ability to dynamically control the risk of this payment. We assume
that all risk is systematic and that investors can observe the manager's risk
choice. As a result, the terminal dividend will evolve according to
dVt
Vt
= (r + ®ºt)dt + ºtdzt (1)
where ºt is the manager's time-t choice of market risk and initial unlevered
¯rm value is normalized to V0 = 1. The process for º must be based on
observable information which, in this setting with only one source of uncer-
tainty, is fully contained in the path of the Brownian motion z. We will refer
to this process as the present value of terminal cash°ows and note that it
also represents the process for unlevered ¯rm value.5
2.2 Taxes and Bankruptcy Costs
Taxes are assumed to be paid only at the corporate level and can be reduced
if the ¯rm pays interest on outstanding debt.6 We assume that the ¯rm's
managers set debt levels by issuing a zero-coupon claim with face value L
and issue price B0(L) at the initial date. The proceeds from the issue are
used exclusively to redeem outstanding shares, so that the only motivation
for their issue is to generate a tax shield. We thus model debt choice within
the context of a tradeo® theory of capital structure.
Tax shields accrue at maturity but only if the ¯rm is solvent. The ¯rm
is considered solvent if bondholders and tax obligations can be paid in full,
in which case the tax amount is
T = ¿(VT ¡ (L ¡ B0(L))
4One may also view VT as the before-tax value of assets-in-place at the terminal date.
This view requires that the assets not be levered up at that date, since in that case
the terminal value would change. We will not consider the e®ects of this type of dynamic
leverage choice, and resort to our simpler but more static view of VT as a terminal payment.
5This follows because taxes of an unlevered ¯rm are proportional to the terminal divi-
dend.
6We ignore the non-debt tax shields associated with the capital required to generate
unlevered ¯rm value so as to focus our attention exclusively on the tax e®ects of leverage.
5where ¿ 2 [0;1) is the ¯rm's tax rate. The expression L ¡ B(L) represents
interest paid to bondholders and reduces taxable income in these states,
hence the tax shield amount is ¿(L ¡ B0(L)).7 In case of insolvency, taxes
are simply
T = ¿VT:
Our state-contingent tax payments are consistent with Kim (1978) who spec-
i¯es that the tax claim is senior to the debt claim and that partial payments
of interest do not reduce taxable income when the ¯rm is bankrupt.
Having speci¯ed the tax payments, we can de¯ne the bankruptcy thresh-
old, V b by the equality V b = L + ¿(V b ¡ (L ¡ B0(L))) which states that the
terminal cash°ow is just su±cient to cover payments to bondholders and the
tax authority. Rearranging the equation yields
V




Note that when taxes are non-zero the bankruptcy threshold is strictly above
the debt face value. Solvent states are de¯ned by VT ¸ V b and, conversely,
insolvent states by VT < V b.
Insolvency is also assumed to have a direct negative impact on terminal
cash°ows due to a proportional deadweight bankruptcy cost ±f(1 ¡ ¿)VT.
We summarize this subsection by expressing the terminal state-contingent
cash°ows of the ¯rm net of taxes an bankruptcy costs as follows:
CT(L) =
½
(1 ¡ ¿)VT + ¿(L ¡ B0(L)) if VT ¸ V b;
(1 ¡ ±f)(1 ¡ ¿)VT otherwise. (3)
This quantity is commonly referred to as free cash°ow and represents funds
available to be paid to any of the ¯rm's claimants.
2.3 Valuation
We seek to derive values at any date prior to T for the ¯rm's terminal cash-
°ows, equity claims and debt claims. These claims are all non-linear functions
of the terminal unlevered cash°ow VT and we price them using the pricing
kernel M. In this subsection, we take as given an arbitrary unlevered termi-
nal ¯rm value VT satisfying the condition V0 = 1 = E (MTVT) and proceed
with the valuation of the these securities.
7To aid exposition of the economic forces at play, we ignore the fact that, in practice,
the tax shield would be received as an amortized amount over the life of the bond.
6We ¯rst value the ¯rm's debt. A circularity arises because the bankruptcy
threshold, V b, depends on the initial debt value, B0(L), and the initial debt
value depends on the bankruptcy threshold. We begin by expressing the
payo® to bondholders at maturity assuming V b is known:
BT(L) =
½
L if VT ¸ V b;
(1 ¡ ±f)(1 ¡ ¿)VT otherwise.
This follows because funds su±cient to fully repay bondholders are available
only when VT is above V b (by the de¯nition of solvency in equation (2)), and
bondholders receive all of the terminal cash°ows otherwise. The initial bond
price B0(L) = E (MTBT(L)) can then be expressed as
B0(L) = E [MTL1VT¸V b + (1 ¡ ±f)(1 ¡ ¿)MTVT1VT<V b]
where the notation 1S is an indicator function for the event S. To make the
bankruptcy threshold consistent with the initial bond price it is required that
V b solves the non-linear equation (2):
V
b = L +
¿
1 ¡ ¿
E [MTL1VT¸V b + (1 ¡ ±f)(1 ¡ ¿)MTVT1VT<V b]: (4)
This condition uniquely identi¯es V b which will, in turn, allow us to easily
express equity value.
Equity claimants only receive payment in solvent states. Formally, the
equity value ST at maturity is given by
ST =
½
CT ¡ L if VT ¸ V b;
0 otherwise.
Recall that the solvency states are de¯ned by CT ¸ L so that the equity
payo® is equal to that of a call option on terminal free cash°ow with strike
price equal to the face value of the bond, i.e. ST = (CT ¡ L)+.8
Alternatively, using equations (2) and (3) one can verify that terminal
equity value is equivalently given by
ST = (1 ¡ ¿)(VT ¡ V
b)
+:
This equation shows that the equity payo® can be expressed as the pay-
o® on (1 ¡ ¿) units of a call option on the unlevered terminal ¯rm cash-
°ow, VT, with strike price V b. Initial equity value is given by S0 = (1 ¡
¿)E
£
MT(VT ¡ V b)+¤
.
8We adopt the common notation X+ = maxf0;Xg.
72.4 Managerial Compensation
Managers are paid at the terminal date with cash and stock. Their terminal
wealth is given by:
WT = A + pST;
where A > 0 is the predetermined cash component of the compensation and
p 2 [0;1] is the proportion of equity granted to the manager.9 Consistent with
the view that moral hazard issues preclude borrowing against ones future
income, we impose the strong restriction that managers cannot undo their
compensation by trading bonds or the index. This friction will play a primary
role in driving the managers choices and serves to model the agency costs
associated with their inability to allocate wealth without restriction.10







where ° > 0 is the coe±cient of relative risk aversion.11
2.5 The Manager's Choices
We assume that self-interested managers are free to choose leverage and
¯rm risk in order to maximize their derived utility from compensation. It
is convenient to consider these choices as occurring in two distinct stages.
Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of events.
In the second stage of the problem the manager has pre-committed to a
¯xed level of debt L, which has been sold for its fair market value B0(L),
and he now controls the standard deviation of unlevered ¯rm value º. This









9We assume that external funds are available for the riskless payment of the cash
component of the compensation, A. Alternatively, we could view the ¯rms assets as
segregated into two accounts: one that the manager can control, worth V0, and another
that he cannot, that is riskless and worth e¡rTA.
10This condition can be weakened if we work in a more realistic setting where ¯rm risk
has an idiosyncratic component that the managers cannot hedge and that only partial
borrowing against the terminal payout is permitted. The economic intuition from our
model will be hold in such a setting but the added complexity would obscure the results.
11Utility is de¯ned by U(WT) = log(WT) if ° = 1.
8where VT is the terminal value of dividends de¯ned by (1) and where the
constant V b is given by (2). We also impose the restriction VT ¸ 0 which is
consistent with limited liability for all ¯rm claimants.
In the ¯rst stage of the decision problem managers announce the face
value of debt (which cannot be later changed), sell it to outside investors, and
repurchase outstanding equity with the proceeds. Managers cannot sell their
own stock, so an increase in debt levels will be accompanied by an increase in
their proportion of the ¯rm's outstanding equity. We assume that investors
with rational expectations correctly forecast the second stage volatility choice
of managers so that debt and equity are fairly priced. Hence, the value of the
the ¯rm after the leverage announcement L is C0(L) = E(MTCT(L)) where
CT(L) is de¯ned by equation (3) and VT in that equation is the correctly
anticipated outcome of the manager's second stage optimization.
We assume that the manager is endowed with an initial equity proportion
in the unlevered ¯rm, p0, and now determine his ¯nal equity proportion
in the levered ¯rm, p. Note that his initial dollar holdings of ¯rm equity
can be represented by p0C0(L) and that after the debt issue and equity
repurchase his dollar holdings can be expressed as p(C0(L)¡B0(L)). Under
our assumptions, these values are equal and serve to de¯ne p:
p0C0(L) = p(C0(L) ¡ B0(L)): (6)




subject to the non-linear equation (6) relating p and L. Two opposing forces
are at play in this problem. Risk averse managers wish to tradeo® risk
and return so as to optimize their terminal wealth. They are restricted to
do this by controlling only leverage and ¯rm volatility. Increasing leverage
provides a tax bene¯t that directly increase ¯rm value, and because managers
hold a proportion p of the ¯rm this increases their wealth. Compensation
is convex, however, and will provide an incentive to increase risk in certain
states. Managers anticipate these actions and so have an incentive to to
choose low leverage in the ¯rst stage. These tradeo®s give rise to predictions
relating the manager's compensation to leverage choice, risk choice and credit
spreads that we explore in the next two sections.
93 Managerial Compensation, Asset Substitu-
tion and Valuation
In this section, we take as given a ¯xed level of debt and analyze the im-
pact of the manager's compensation package on his risk choice in the second
stage optimization problem (5). Our problem admits a closed form solution,
and we explicitly demonstrate how managers engage in asset substitution,
whereby ¯rm variance rises when value falls. This action a®ects all asset
values and we will focus our analysis on the implications for credit spread
dynamics. We show that compensation terms can be set so that anticipated
asset substitution generates high bond yields even when current levels of
leverage and ¯rm asset volatility are low.
3.1 Characterizing Asset Substitution
In our complete market setting, dynamically controlling the volatility process
º is equivalent to choosing the state-contingent terminal cash°ow VT. The










subject to the budget constraint E (MTVT) · V0, the positivity constraint
VT ¸ 0, and where V b is de¯ned by (2).
The objective in problem (8) is non-standard due to the kink at VT = V b
induced by the compensation function. Fortunately, this class of problems
has been previously studied by Carpenter (2000) who shows that a solution
can be characterized once the objective function is \concavi¯ed" (see Au-
mann and Perles (1968)). The following proposition formulates the optimal
second stage choice:
Proposition 1 Let V be the unique solution to the nonlinear equation
·








= p(1 ¡ ¿)
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12See Karatzas et al (1987) and Cox and Huang (1989).

















where M 2 (0;1) is the unique scalar such that E (MTVT) = V0.
This proposition gives the state-contingent optimal choice of terminal
dividends VT as a function of the pricing kernel at that date, MT (which
may be viewed as a summary statistic for the state). To understand the
manager's actions begin by substituting MT = M in equation (10) to see
that in this state the terminal dividend is VT = V . Equation (10) therefore
shows that the optimal terminal cash°ow will never lie in the interval (0;V ).
It is intuitive that the manager does not value dividends below V b because his
compensation is °at in that region. Proposition 1 follows because convexity
in the compensation schedule makes the manager risk neutral over terminal
payo®s in the range [0;V ] and although it is not immediately apparent from
equation (9), V is larger than V b. An immediate consequence of this local
risk-neutrality is that dividends lying within this region are dominated by
dividends with the same present value but divided between a zero payo®
state and states with payo®s larger than V .
Figure 2 illustrates the impact of concavi¯cation on the manager's optimal
choice by plotting the probability density function of the terminal cash°ow.13
Two motives give rise to this density. The ¯rst is the manager's inherent atti-
tude toward risk, summarized by °, which drives the (translated) lognormal
behavior in good times. The second is the asset substitution induced by the
convexity of the compensation. The manager has an incentive to e®ectively
gamble in bad times to provide the possibility to end his tenure with valuable
stock. One important implication of the gambling behavior is that the ¯rm
assets may end up worthless (VT = 0) with positive probability.
The manager's choice of terminal cash°ow is second-best when compared
to his allocation decision when he is not constrained from trading his com-
pensation package. We now consider his ¯rst-best choice if given the same
13See the appendix for The formula for this pdf is in the appendix. The ¯gure is
generated using the parameters r = 0:05, ® = 0:33, V0 = 1, A = 0:005, p = 0:01, L = 0:5,
° = 2, T = 5 and ¿ = 0:3. Its qualitative features are robust to arbitrary parameterizations
with A > 0 and L > 0.
11amount of wealth, but in the form of compensation comprised solely of a
proportion ^ p > p of the equity of an unlevered ¯rm:
sup
VT
U(^ p(1 ¡ ¿)VT) (11)
subject to V0 = E(MTVT).14 We refer to this case as the \Merton Bench-
mark" because the manager's optimal terminal wealth choice is provided
by Merton (1971). The state-contingent dividend can be written as VT =
(¸MT)¡1=° where ¸ solves the problem's constraint.
Figure 3 plots the manager's terminal wealth, along with the Merton
Benchmark allocation, as a function of the pricing kernel level at the termi-
nal date. The two wealth schedules cross twice at the points M and M¤,
consistent with the fact that they have the same present value. We again
see the e®ect of asset substitution activity, where in states with high levels
of the pricing kernel the manager has set VT = 0 so that terminal wealth
is A. To achieve ¯rst-best, he would like to sell claims from states where
Arrow-Debreu prices are high (i.e. when MT > M¤). This would require
him to sell the ¯xed component of his pay, however, and this is not permit-
ted. This highlights that the important friction generating asset substitution
derives from the assumption that the manager cannot borrow against the
cash component of his compensation.
We now explicitly characterize risk taking behavior in the second stage:
Proposition 2 For any time t 2 [0;T), the manager's optimal volatility







































where °¤ = 1 ¡ 1=°,
d(x;m) =
µ
¡lnm + r(T ¡ t) ¡
®2
2





14To hold wealth in the two problems constant, the equity proportion ^ p must solve
^ p(1¡¿)V0 = e¡rTA+pE(MTST) where ST is the optimal terminal stock value associated
with the second stage optimization with compensation terms (A;p).
12N(:) and n(:) are the standard normal cumulative distribution and density


























Risk choice is illustrated in Figure 4, where time-t standard deviation of
unlevered asset value, ºt is plotted against the present value of ¯rm cash°ows
Vt. In the graph, we also plot the standard deviation chosen in the Merton
Benchmark case which can be shown to be equal to a constant level ºM
t =
®=°. We see that when Vt is low, ¯rm volatility is higher than the Merton
level. If stock is deep out-of-the-money, asset substitution incentives can
become very strong and the ¯rm can become extremely risky. As Vt increases
¯rm stock becomes in-the-money, the bene¯t of deviating from the Merton
strategy falls. In the limit when stock is deep in-the-money, the manager
volatility choice converges to the Merton volatility. This is intuitive because
stock becomes the dominant component of his compensation in these states
and the probability of bankruptcy becomes small.
Figure 4 also shows that volatility choice is not necessarily a monotonic
function of Vt. In particular, if the cash component is relatively low we
observe a U-shaped function whereby volatility can be reduced below even
the Merton level.15 This re°ects the fact that his compensation can actually
induce conservative behavior when the manager acts to keep his ¯rm's stock
in-the-money and secure ¯nal pay above A.16
3.2 Security Valuation with Asset Substitution
We now provide closed-form expressions for the market price of the ¯rm's
bonds and levered assets. We demonstrate the impact of asset substitution
on these values and show how it a®ects credit spreads and their dynamics.
15The function can be shown to be non-monotonic if A < p(1 ¡ ¿)V b.
16For another perspective on this behavior in a portfolio allocation setting, see Carpenter
(2000).
133.2.1 Bond Prices, Credit Spreads and their Dynamics
The bond value provides the basis for valuation of all other ¯rm claims and we
begin by deriving its price. As we demonstrated in the previous subsection,
at the terminal date the ¯rm will either be solvent with VT ¸ V > V b, or
insolvent with VT = 0. Bondholders will thus receive the face value L when




Mt BT(L) j Ft
´
results in the time-t bond price
Bt(L) = Le
¡r(T¡t) N(d(1;Mt=M)); (13)
where the function d is de¯ned in Proposition 2.
The last term in the bond pricing expression is the risk-neutral probability
that the ¯rm will be solvent. When discounted, it represents the value of an
Arrow-Debreu security paying $1 in the solvent state. This intuition accounts
for the particularly simple form of the pricing relationship.









The corresponding credit spread is:




This equation shows that the credit spread is proportional to the logarithm
of the risk-neutral probability of solvency since the ¯rm is solvent if MT < M
and the term N(d(1;Mt=M)) gives the risk-neutral probability of this event
contingent on the current level of the pricing kernel, Mt.
We will compare these credit spreads to spreads from the Merton bench-
mark model. Bond prices in that setting, where volatility is held constant at
ºM
t = ®=°, are given by a slightly more complicated formula because of the
fact that bondholders receive a non-zero payo® in the insolvent states:
B
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14This is essentially the formula provided in Merton (1974) but with non-zero
taxes and bankruptcy costs. As in the Merton model, the bond can be
replicated by a long position in a riskless bond with face value L and short
positions in options. In our context, one must write two option contracts to
complete the hedge. The ¯rst contract is (1¡±f)(1¡¿) units of puts on the
terminal cash°ow, VT, with strike price V b. The second contract is a binary
option that pays the foregone tax shield ¿(L ¡ B0(L)) and the bankruptcy
cost ±f(1 ¡ ¿)V b when the ¯rm is insolvent. The net payo® from the hedge
accounts for the fact that bondholders are residual claimants to non-zero
¯rm value in solvent states, but themselves incur the costs of bankruptcy.
They of course anticipate this payo® structure, as re°ected in the pricing
function (15). This formula can be used to calculate yields and spreads for
this benchmark.
Figure 5 presents the relationship between credit spreads and the present
value of terminal cash°ows for various levels of the cash component of com-
pensation, A. The Merton spreads for low (±f = 0) and high (±f = 0:5)
bankruptcy costs are also depicted. The ¯gure shows that when asset sub-
stitution e®ects are present, the credit spread is uniformly higher than that
produced by the Merton model with zero bankruptcy costs. Credit spreads
increase as A increases, again consistent with the intuition that increasing in-
surance against bad outcomes enhances risk taking incentives. These spreads
can be substantial even for high levels of Vt where debt to equity ratios are
low. Furthermore, our model is capable of generating yields higher than in
the Merton benchmark even when unlevered asset volatility is low. Referring
to Figure 4, observe that with A = 0:0005 the current level of volatility is
approximately equal to the Merton level if Vt = 0:75, yet our yields at this
level of Vt are considerably higher than the Merton benchmark with zero
bankruptcy costs (see Figure 5).
It is interesting to note that asset substitution does not necessarily in-
crease yields. Observe that in Figure 5 credit spreads from the Merton model
with high bankruptcy costs can exceed credit spreads generated by our model.
This occurs because although risk shifting serves to reallocate a portion of
the terminal cash°ows to zero, it also reallocates cash°ows from insolvent
states (where bankruptcy costs would be incurred) to the solvent states.
Bondholders will approve of this activity when the bene¯t associated with
the higher probability of solvency exceeds the cost of potentially receiving
zero payment.
In addition to its e®ect on credit spreads, asset substitution also has a
15direct impact on bond return volatility. Using It^ o's Lemma, the instanta-
neous standard deviation ´t of the bond return de¯ned by dBt(L)=Bt(L) can








This function is closely related to equation (14) since credit spreads are pro-
portional to the risk-neutral probability of solvency, N(d(1;Mt=M)). In fact,
the model predicts a relationship between credit spreads and bond return
volatility that is independent of the terms of the manager's contract, (A;p),












where N ¡1 is the inverse function of the standard normal cumulative distri-
bution function.
Bond return standard deviation is plotted against credit spreads for bonds
with a ¯xed time to maturity in Figure 6. The ¯gure also plots the relation-
ships predicted by the Merton benchmark model with low and high bank-
ruptcy costs. The ¯gure shows that bond return volatilities are uniformily
higher in the presence of asset substitution. High bankruptcy costs are re-
quired in the Merton model to generate comparable levels of bond return
volatility at low yield levels. The ¯gure also highlights that equation (18)
is a strictly increasing and unbounded function of credit spreads. On the
other hand, the Merton bond return volatilities are bounded. This can be
understood by considering the behavior of the Merton bond prices at extreme
levels of Vt. When ¯rm value is very high and credit spreads are near zero,
the bonds are essentially riskless and volatility is zero. When ¯rm value is
very low and credit spreads are very high, the bonds are like equity claims on
¯rm value net of taxes and bankruptcy costs, (1¡±f)(1¡¿)VT. The cash°ows
that bondholders receive in this case are proportional to unlevered ¯rm value
and, as a consequence, have the same volatility. In this particular case, bond
return standard deviation asymptotically approaches the limit ®=° which is
the Merton standard deviation of the ¯rm's unlevered assets.
Equation (18) also provides advice for hedging credit risk. It shows that
the proportional amount of a hedging instrument in the risky bond's repli-
cating portfolio can be determined with knowledge of only the bond's credit
spread.
163.2.2 Levered Firm Value
We now provide an expression for the present value of the ¯rm's terminal
free cash°ows at any date:
Proposition 3 For any time t 2 [0;T), total ¯rm value is given by:
Ct = (1 ¡ ¿)Vt + ¿(L ¡ B0(L))e
¡r(T¡t) N(d(1;Mt=M)); (19)
where the function d is de¯ned in Proposition 2 and B0(L) is given by equa-
tion (13) with t = 0.
Firm value is composed of three parts. The quantity (1 ¡ ¿)Vt is the un-
levered ¯rm value. The next term in equation (19) is the present value of
tax shields. The di®erence between the face value payment and the initial
debt proceeds, L ¡ B0(L), represents the interest expense that is deductible
if the ¯rm is solvent. When multiplied by the tax rate, ¿, this represents
the tax savings. Tax shields are then discounted by multiplying the termi-
nal savings by the value of the binary option paying o® in solvent states,
e¡r(T¡t) N(d(1;Mt=M)).
The ¯nal part of ¯rm value is the bankruptcy cost. Bankruptcy costs
are assumed to be proportional to the terminal cash°ow VT when the ¯rm
is insolvent. The manager optimally avoids having positive value in these
states, however, so these costs are never incurred. As a result, there is no
term relating bankruptcy cost to ¯rm value in equation (19).17
The manager's contract terms (A;p) a®ect his risk-taking behavior and,
as a consequence, ¯rm value. To understand the link consider the e®ect
of an increase in A. The cash component of the compensation represents
insurance for bad outcomes which are more tolerable when A is high. Bond
prices thus decrease due to the increase in asset substitution. In our model,
¯rm value is a®ected only through the impact on the tax shield. There are
two e®ects. First, as the bond price falls, the amount of interest expense,
L ¡ B0(L), increases. On the other hand, the probability of receiving the
reduction in taxes falls. These two opposing forces give rise to the non-
monotonic relationship between A and ¯rm value, C0, as demonstrated in
Figure 7.
17This counterfactual implication can be addressed but at the expense of further compli-
cating the analysis in this paper. For example, our model could be augmented to include
a managerial bankruptcy penalty of the form ±M(V b ¡ VT)+. This would introduce a set
of insolvent states in which ¯rm value is positive.
17A related argument holds for changes in p. An increase in the man-
ager's stock compensation leads to more risk aversion as a result of increased
sensitivity to VT (see Ross (2004)). Bond prices are, therefore, an increasing
function of p. We again see that a non-monotonic relationship exists between
p and ¯rm value. For low levels of p, debt is risky and the tax shield amount
at maturity, ¿(L¡B0(L)), is high. It is not likely to be received, however, so
the value of the binary option paying o® in the solvent state is low. For high
levels of p the opposite is true. Intermediate levels of the variable give rise
to the highest present value of tax shields and, consequently, to the highest
levels of ¯rm value.
4 The Leverage Choice
In this section, we analyze the manager's leverage choice in the ¯rst stage
optimization problem (7). We begin by undertaking a comparative static
analysis of the e®ect of leverage on ¯rm value in both our model and the
Merton benchmark. We then study how our risk-averse manager chooses
optimal leverage. This choice problem relates to the manager's contract
terms and we provide explicit testable implications linking ¯rm leverage to
managerial compensation.
4.1 The E®ect of Leverage on Firm Value
In our setting, ¯rm value is sensitive to leverage levels because of its e®ects
on tax shields and bankruptcy costs. We ¯rst demonstrate these tradeo®s in
the Merton benchmark model. We then contrast these predictions to those
of our model to highlight the role of asset substitution undertaken by the
manager in the second-stage.
4.1.1 Firm Value and Debt in the Merton Benchmark
Firm value in the Merton benchmark model is given by
C
M
t = (1 ¡ ¿)V
M




















where ~ °1, ~ °2 and V M
t were previously de¯ned in equation (16). This expres-
sion has three terms: the unlevered ¯rm asset value, the present value of tax
18shields, and the present value of bankruptcy costs. Debt levels a®ect ¯rm
value through the last two terms.
Figure 8 shows that a ¯rm value maximizing leverage level exists even
without bankruptcy costs. The intuition for this result is as follows. The
tax shield amount at maturity, ¿(L ¡ BM
0 (L)), is increasing in the face
value of debt.18 Its present value is obtained by multiplying by the term
e¡r(T¡t)N (°d(~ °1)), which is directly proportional to the risk-neutral prob-
ability of solvency. When leverage increases, this probability falls. In the
Merton benchmark, neither of these two opposing e®ects is dominant for all
levels of leverage. Thus, when L increases, ¯rm value initially rises above its
unlevered value, (1 ¡¿)Vt, and eventually falls back to the same value when
L is large.
Firm value is reduced when bankruptcy costs are present. Furthermore,
increasing bankruptcy costs reduces the leverage level at which ¯rm value is
maximized (see Figure 8).
4.1.2 Firm Value and Debt with Asset Substitution
We now examine the sensitivity of ¯rm value to debt levels when managers
can control the ¯rm value process in the second stage. We undertake a
simple comparative static analysis whereby all parameters in the model are
held constant except the face value of debt, L.
Figure 9 plots ¯rm value from equation (19) as a function of leverage.
This ¯gure shows that the manager's second stage risk choices act to make
¯rm value a strictly increasing function of leverage. Unlike in the Merton
benchmark, this occurs because an increase in leverage causes the tax shield
amount to rise at a faster rate than the risk neutral solvency probability falls.
An important implication of our analysis is that asset substitution will
not necessarily reduce ¯rm value. In fact, our model shows that at high
leverage levels ¯rm value can be enhanced relative to the Merton benchmark
where no risk shifting occurs.
4.2 Optimal Leverage
We now study the properties of the optimal leverage choice. In order to un-
dertake this analysis we utilize standard numerical methods to approximate
18This follows from the fact that BM
0 (L)=L represents the value of a claim paying $1 in
solvency and must decrease when bankruptcy becomes more likely.
19the solution to (7).19
Managers trade o® two opposing e®ects when selecting ¯rm leverage. On
one hand, their wealth is increasing in leverage due to the tax e®ects previ-
ously described. Managers are risk averse, however, and they internalize the
fact that their leverage decision will pre-commit them to risk shift, thereby
penalizing their derived utility.20 The purpose of our numerical exercise is
to quantify which of the two forces is dominant under various compensation
terms.
The top panel in Figure 10 depicts the relationship between optimal lever-
age and the cash component of the manager's compensation, A. This rela-
tionship is U-shaped. The cash component of compensation provides the
manager with insurance, so when A is high the manager's risk aversion is rel-
atively low. In such cases he perceives the cost of increasing the face value of
debt to be low. Optimal leverage is, therefore, increasing in A in this region.
The bottom panel in Figure 10 relates credit spreads for newly issued debt
to A. Note that this function is upward sloping and that the magnitude of
credit spreads are large when A is large. This implies that managers with
compensation that is relatively safe are issuing very risky debt.
An interesting implication of Figure 10 is that when the cash component
of compensation is low, managers choose to issue high levels of safe debt.
This behavior can be understood by considering the special case in which
A = 0. Managers will avoid running their ¯rm into bankruptcy at all costs,
since their marginal utility is in¯nite at zero wealth. It seems counterintuitive
that they would then add leverage. This intuition does not account for the
fact that they control volatility and have the ability to ensure ¯rm value
achieves a ¯xed lower bound at the terminal date. In selecting the optimal
debt level, managers will thus tradeo® the cost of achieving this lower bound
through their asset substitution policy against the tax shields associated with
safe debt.
Following this logic, when A is low, the manager's second stage choice of
terminal cash°ows results in a ¯rm with low risk. In these cases, his derived
19Numerical solutions to the ¯rst stage problem are straightforward to compute due to
existence of the closed form expressions derived in Section 3. In our particular implemen-
tation we have used the one-dimensional function optimization routine from the Matlab
Optimization Toolbox.
20We prove in the appendix that in the absence of taxation managers optimally choose
not to issue debt. This is a direct consequence of their risk aversion, since in that case no
wealth e®ects are present.
20utility of wealth is relatively high. As a result, his inherent risk aversion does
not have as strong a dampening e®ect on leverage.
An important empirical implication of our model is that low ¯rm leverage
can be associated with low or high credit spreads. For example, again refer-
ring to Figure 10 we see that if a manager chooses to issue debt with face
value around 0:2, the credit spread can be as low as 2% or as high as 15%.
This highlights that compensation terms interact with the leverage choice
and asset substitution. The riskiness of debt is not only determined by ¯rm
characteristics, but also by observable aspects of the manager's pay.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated the relevance of the agency costs of
Jensen and Meckling (1976) for structural models of leverage choice and
credit spreads. In particular, we have assumed a realistic compensation struc-
ture for risk-averse managers, consisting of cash and stock. We showed that
managers will optimally choose to lever the ¯rm and that their resulting
wealth will be convex in unlevered asset value. This convexity induces asset
substitution, leading to riskier payouts and higher credit spreads than pre-
dicted by the prior literature. Finally, we demonstrated that optimal leverage
choice is the result of a balance between tax bene¯ts and the utility cost of
ex-post risk shifting.
Our model can be extended in many interesting directions. One possibilty
is to consider the optimal contract from the shareholders' perspective. This
would require that we consider one more prior optimization problem in which
the amount of cash compensation and the number of unlevered shares are
determined, subject to a participation constraint.
A more ambitious extension would place our model in a dynamic context.
The model in this paper could be considered one stage of a multi-period
problem in which periodic capital structure and default decisions could be
made. Dynamic contracting as in Heinkel and Stoughton (1994) could also be
incorporated. These changes, if analytically tractible, would add signi¯cant
realism and allow for empirical tests of a dynamic capital structure model in
which risk shifting plays an important role.
21Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Proposition 1 is a reformulation of Theorem 1
in Carpenter (2000). Here, we provide a new proof that applies techniques
from convex analysis and generalizes Carpenter's Theorem to a larger class of
compensation schedules. For additional mathematical detail see, for example,
Rockafellar (1970) or Chapter 3 of Ekeland and Turnbull (1983).





1¡° if x ¸ 0;
+1 otherwise.






Similarly, the function '¤¤ : lR ¡! lR denotes the double Legendre-Fenchel






We will use two basic results from convex analysis.
R1 The function '¤¤ is the convex envelope of ', that is, the function '¤¤
is the largest convex function dominated by ';
R2 If '¤ admits a supporting line21 at x 2 lR with slope k, then '¤¤ admits
a supporting line at k with a slope x.
21The function '¤ admits a supporting line at x if there exists k 2 lR such that
'¤(y) ¸ '¤(x) + k(y ¡ x);
for all y 2 lR. We will say then that '¤ admits a supporting line at x with slope k. The
geometric meaning of a supporting line is intuitive: the supporting line must be uniformly
below the graph of the function '¤. For instance, a convex and di®erentiable function
admits a supporting line at any point and the supporting line, in this case, is just the
familiar tangent line. Supporting lines are also called subdi®erentials.




subject to E(MTVT) · V0:
The problem P is not standard because we minimize a non convex function.
The strategy of the proof goes as follow: We ¯rst solve a "convexi¯ed" version
of problem P de¯ned as
~ P :
infVT E ['¤¤(VT)];
subject to E(MTVT) · V0;
and then show that the optimum for ~ P is actually an optimum for P.






+1 if y > 0;
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if y 2 ['0(V );0];
¡'(0) = A1¡°
1¡° if y · '0(V );
where the constant V is de¯ned in Proposition 1. Therefore, '¤ is di®eren-

















if y 2 ('0(V );0);
0 if y < '0(V ):
Furthermore, at the point y = '0(V ), the function '¤ has many supporting
lines with slopes in the interval [0;V ] since V is the right derivative of '¤
at '0(V ). Finally, the double Legendre-Frenchel transform '¤¤ can also be






+1 if x < 0;
¡A1¡°
1¡° ¡ p(1 ¡ ¿)
¡
A + p(1 ¡ ¿)(V ¡ V b)
¢¡°
x if x 2 [0;V ]
'(x) otherwise.
Let us now proceed with the actual proof of Proposition 1. First, let
us consider problem ~ P. The problem ~ P is convex since the function '¤¤ is
22Note that the positivity constraint is now incorporated in the de¯nition of ' and that
the maximization has been replaced with a minimization because ' reverses the sign of
the utility function.
23convex (this is an implication of the result R1). So, by standard result from
optimization (Luenberger (1969)) the ¯rst order conditions
r'
¤¤(VT) = ¡¸MT; ¸ > 0 is such that E(MTVT) = V0;
are both necessary and su±cient. We see then that the ¯rst order conditions
for problem ~ P stipulate that '¤¤ admits a supporting line at VT with slope
¡¸MT (almost surely). Given the supporting line duality result R2, we see
that the the ¯rst order conditions for problem ~ P may be restated by saying
that '¤ admits a supporting line at ¡¸MT with slope VT (almost surely).
Given the closed form expression of '¤ we see that the ¯rst order conditions
















if ¡ ¸MT > '0(V );
0 if ¡ ¸MT · '0(V );
with the budget restriction E(MTVT) = V0. Expression (10) is then obtained
by substituting M = ¡
'0(V )
¸ in the above expression for VT.
The last step of the proof is to establish that the optimal VT for ~ P is also
optimal for P. To see this, observe ¯rst that ' and '¤¤ take on the same
value on the the interval f0g[[V ;+1]. Therefore, since VT takes value only
on the set f0g [ [V ;+1], we have
E ['(X) ¡ '(VT)] = E ['(X) ¡ '
¤¤(VT)] ¸ E ['
¤¤(X) ¡ '
¤¤(VT)]
for any feasible X satisfying E(MTX) = V0. Now, from the ¯rst order
conditions of Problem ~ P, we know that '¤¤ admits a supporting line at VT
with slope ¡¸MT. Consequently, from the de¯nition of supporting lines,
E ['
¤¤(X) ¡ '
¤¤(VT)] ¸ ¡E [¸MT (X ¡ VT)] = 0
thereby proving the optimality of VT for Problem P.
23When ¡¸MT = '0(V ) the ¯rst order conditions mandate that VT could take any value
in the interval [0;V ] because '¤ has multiple supporting lines at '0(V ). We selected the
value 0 for VT in the state ¡¸MT = '0(V ). This choice will have no impact on the ¯nal
utility since the probability of the event f¡¸MT = '0(V )g is just 0 given the lognormal
distribution of MT.







together with the dynamic equation for the state price density and the op-
timal ¯rm value given in (10) give the expression for time t ¯rm value, Vt,
in Proposition 2. To see this, observe that conditional on Ft, ln(MT) is
normally distributed with mean ln(Mt) ¡ (r + ®2=2)(T ¡ t) and variance
®2(T ¡ t). Substituting the expression for VT in (10), and computing the
expectation in the relevant regions yields the expression for Vt as a function
of Mt. Application of It^ o's Lemma to Vt results in equation (12) for time-t
volatility.
Proof of Proposition 3. Expression (19) follows by computing the
expectation in appropriate regions, using equation (3) and the valuation for-
mula Ct = E
h
MT
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Figure 1: Timeline describing the manager's decision problems.
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Figure 2: Density function for VT using the base case parameteriza-
tion.























Figure 3: Optimal choice of VT as a function of the pricing kernel
MT under the base case parameterization.















Figure 4: Volatility choice as a function of the ¯rm asset value in
the base case.




































Figure 5: Credit spreads as a function of the asset value in the base
case.





















































Figure 6: Bond return volatility as a function of the bond yield in
the base case.


















Figure 7: Firm value as functions of the manager's cash payment A
(top panel) and stock holdings p (bottom panel). All other parameters
are as in the base case.






























Figure 8: Firm value as a function of the face value of debt in the
Merton benchmark model.
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Figure 9: Firm value as a function of the face value of debt for
various levels of the cash component of compensation.































































Figure 10: The optimal choice of leverage (top panel) and the credit
spread at issuance (bottom panel) as functions of the cash compo-
nent of the manager's compensation.
39